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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP.,
a Utah corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case Not 870489-CA
)

vs.
)

DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and
BETTY J. ROBERTS,
Defendants/Appellants.

)
)
)

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of spiecific performance entered
by the Third District Court on June 23, 1987. On November 2, 1987, the case was
poured over to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Appellants assert that the issues are whether an option must be exercised in
accordance with its terms and whether a party who pajys the debt of another is
entitled to recover the amount of such payment. Respondent disagrees with that
statement of issues. A review of the findings of fact and Conclusions of law entered
by the trial court provides no basis for appellants' statement of the issues. The trial
court did not find that an option existed, or that any option had been exercised;
whether in conformity with its terms or otherwise. Nor did the trial court find that
either party should recover the amount of a payment made on behalf of the other
party.
Respondent asserts that the issues before this court afe:

-I-

(1)

Whether the trial court erred in granting specific performance of a

contract between Property Assistance Corp. and Douglas C. and Betty J.
Roberts; and
(2)

Whether this appeal is moot.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Respondent agrees with appellants* statement that there are no constitutional
or statutory provisions whose interpretation is determinative of the issues presented
by this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for enforcement of a contract by specific performance, or in the
alternative, for damages.

The case was tried to the court on J u n e 16, 1987.

Appellants did not present evidence. The trial court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment and decree of specific performance. This appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-respondent Property Assistance Corp. ("Property Assistance") is a
Utah corporation in the business of real estate investment, particularly investment
in distressed properties. (Trial transcript pp. 11-12, Record at 000153-4.)
In January of 1986, William J. Oelerich, president and operating officer of
Property Assistance, learned that defendants-appellants Douglas C. and Betty J.
Roberts (the "Roberts") had defaulted in payments due on a note and second trust
deed encumbering their home located at 8021 Erique Way in Sandy, Utah. The
Roberts had failed to cure the default and their house was scheduled to be sold at a
trustee's sale on February 5, 1986. (Exhibit 1-P.) The note was in the approximate
amount of $40,000 and was owed to Tracy Collins Bank & Trust ("Tracy Collins").

9.

Oelerich contacted the Roberts on behalf of Property Assistance and negotiated
an agreement. On February 2, 1986, the parties entered into an agreement (the
"Agreement"), a copy of which appears in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit " 1 " .
The Agreement between Property Assistance and the Roberts contained the
following provisions:
(1)

That Property Assistance would pay thelRoberts $2,000 at the time

the Agreement was executed;
(2)

That Property Assistance would market Ithe Roberts' home at a fair

market price. When the house was sold, Property Assistance would pay the
Roberts 25% of the net proceeds of sale;
(3)

That Property Assistance would assume responsibility for the first

and second mortgages (the obligation to Tracy Collins) until the house was
sold; and
(4)

That the Roberts would continue to occupy the house and pay rent to

Property Assistance until the house was sold.
At the time of the execution of the Agreement, Property Assistance paid $2,000 to
the Roberts. (Trial transcript p. 45, Record at 000157.) At the time the parties
entered into the Agreement, there were two obligations on the Roberts' home
secured by trust deed; a first mortgage in favor of First Federal Savings & Loan and
the second mortgage in favor of Tracy Collins. 1
After the Agreement was signed, Oelerich contacted Tracy Collins to make
arrangements to forestall the trustee sale. Property Assistance deposited $40,000

l

The obligations secured by the Roberts' home are referred to for convenience as
mortgages, even though the obligations were secured qy trust deeds.
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with Tracy Collins and Tracy Collins agreed to postpone its trustee sale. If, however,
the transaction were not completed within 21 days, Property Assistance would
forfeit $5,000 to Tracy Collins as liquidated damages. (Exhibit 4-P, Trial transcript
p. 16, Record at 000158.)
The Roberts' house was also subject to a first mortgage in favor of First Federal
Savings & Loan. Property Assistance secured the approval of First Federal for its
assumption of this loan. (Trial transcript p. 17, Record at 000159-60.)
On February 7, 1986, the Roberts signed a document entitled "Extension of
Option" providing that the time period set forth in the original agreement would be
extended until February 26, 1986. (Exhibit 7-P, Trial transcript p. 20, Record at
000162.)
Prior to the time that the Roberts had signed their initial agreement with
Property Assistance, their house had been listed for sale with a realtor, Eagar &
Company. Property Assistance continued that listing by entering into a listing
agreement with Eagar & Company on February 10,1986.
On February 13, 1986, Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase the
property from David and Vicki Hill. The purchase price was to be $82,500. (Exhibit
8-P, Trial transcript p. 22, Record at 000164.)
During February of 1986, Oelerich, acting on behalf of Property Assistance,
informed the Roberts of all the steps he was taking with respect to the sale of the
property, including his agreement with Tracy Collins, listing the property for sale,
and acceptance of the offer to purchase the property.
On February 21, 1986, Property Assistance paid off the second mortgage in
favor of Tracy Collins in the amount of $40,069.87. At that time, Tracy Collins
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executed a full reconveyance of its trust deed. (Trial transcript pp. 29-30, Record at
000171-2.)
During February of 1986, Oelerich, on behalf of Property Assistance, also
discussed with Roberts the desirability of avoiding two closings, t h a t is, a
conveyance of the property to Property Assistance and then a second conveyance of
the property from Property Assistance to the purchasers,,David and Vicki Hill. The
Roberts indicated that they agreed that two closings should be avoided. (Finding of
Fact no. 11, Trial transcript pp. 24-35, Record at 000166-71.)
On February 22, 1986, Oelerich met with the Roberts concerning a further
extension of the Agreement between Property Assistance and the Roberts. Betty
Roberts signed an agreement to extend the Agreement to April 18, 1986, but
Douglas Roberts refused to do so, seeking instead to change the terms of the
Agreement to increase his percentage of sale proceeds., (Trial transcript p. 29,
Record at 000171.)
On February 26,1986, the Roberts paid Property Assistance the sum of $500.00
representing rent on the property for the month of February. On March 14, 1986,
Property Assistance paid the first mortgage holder, First! Federal Savings & Loan,
the sum of $368.90 to bring payments on the first mortgage on the property current.
After February 26, 1986, the Roberts paid no more amounts as rent or
otherwise to Property Assistance and refused to perform uiftder the Agreement.
SUMMARY OK ARGUMENT^
I.

THE TRIAL COURT P R O P E R L Y G R A N T E D S P E C I F I C
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 2,1986.

As the trial court found, the Agreement between the parties was not a "true"
option. The trial court properly found that the agreement between the parties was
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the equivalent of an earnest money agreement and thus was capable of being
specifically performed.
II.

THIS APPEAL IS NOW MOOT.

The Roberts never posted a supersedeas bond in this matter. Despite numerous
efforts on their part to avoid implementation of the decree, including filing
bankruptcy, the Roberts were eventually unable to avoid the consequences of the
court's judgment and decree. At this time, the Roberts have deeded the property over
to Property Assistance and have surrendered possession. Property Assistance is
proceeding with the provisions of the decree of specific performance and is marketing
the house for sale. Property Assistance has also assumed the financial burdens
associated with the property. Thus, it would be impossible to return the parties to
their status before the decree was entered and the appeal is moot.
HI.

IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT GRANTED S P E C I F I C
P E R F O R M A N C E , PROPERTY A S S I S T A N C E W O U L D BE
E N T I T L E D TO R E C O V E R FROM T H E R O B E R T S T H E
AMOUNTS IT PAID TO TRACY COLLINS TO P R E V E N T
FORECLOSURE.

The issue whether the Roberts were unjustly enriched is not properly before the
court. However, in the event the court wishes to consider this issue, if a decree of
specific performance were not entered, Property Assistance would be entitled to a
judgment for the amounts it paid to Tracy Collins on the theory of unjust
enrichment.
ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DECREE OF
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The Roberts' entire argument with respect to Property Assistance's failure to
exercise its option in strict conformity with its terms is premised on their contention
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t h a t the A g r e e m e n t between the parties was an "option" 1 in the normal sense of t h a t
word. T h a t contention ignores the actuti! termsnf the Agreemer* :• th-- «.*nse.
U n d e r an-r-J':-..-.: .• -•

?

• ; - , * : . , ; - , > ; i - :« r a specified aiin.uiii in . -t u,n ",y*

the ri^ht to pi r:nase partn m a r real property at a certain price within a certain time
period. Usually, the buyer must exercise the option in a [specific m a n n e r ; that i;
m u s t give notice to the seller *'

•

.

J.IM ;• - property within ;..-/

specified, time period ' Fhe upturn tlum "ripens" into an a g r e e m e n t for the purchase of
real property.
In t h i s case, s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s of :;

1

•

;a

=

'^ini,

a: . *,t

imporlai.il>, m> puichas* 1 price was specified in the Agreement. No time for closing
of the purchase was set forth. No date for possession of the property was included.
ObviousK then, the parties intended something here different fron 1 a ty pica! option
agreement.
U n d e r the Agreement, Property Assistance had the fbllowing obligations:
To pay $2,000 to the Roberts;
1

m;ilo j iho first mortgage payment;

. ) prevent the second mortgage holder from foreclosing; and
-•

I'o m a r k e t the property.

The Roberts' obligations were to oeci ipy the pi operty and to pay r e n t until the
propei ty v •

.0 n third pa rty. When the sale to thel third party occurred, the

parties would share the proceeds in the m a n n e r set forth ir} the Agreement.
The trial court concluded t h a t the Agreement was not a i n le option h\ it the
••''j:i:'/:ii:i!i' •>' • . '',:i!;i-- : m<.-ney receipt and offer u-- purchase winch was accepted by
the Roberts,

i he trial court also concluded t h a t p u r s u a n t to the Agreement, the

price of the property was $40,069.87 (the a m o u n t n e e e s b a n
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to p;iy the second

mortgage to Tracy Collins), plus the balance on the first mortgage to First Federal
Savings & Loan, plus the $2,000 paid to the Roberts at the time of the execution of
the Agreement, plus 25% of the net proceeds of the sale of the property.
The cases cited in the Roberts' brief in support of their argument that the terms
of an option must be strictly complied with involve different kinds of contracts. For
example, T. W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo.App.
1970) involved a contract for the sale of 50 acres of land. There were successive
options for the purchase of additional land. The buyer had exercised several options
and attempted to exercise an additional option. The court held that, because the
option required written exercise, oral exercise of the option was not effective.
In Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah 1974), the parties had entered into
an option agreement which allowed the buyers to purchase the property for an
agreed price of $18,000, $17,000 of which must be in cash. One day prior to the
expiration of the option period, the buyers notified the defendants of their intent to
exercise the option and their intent to pay $17,000 by personal check. The seller had
refused to accept tender by personal check and the court held that, because the
agreement required payment in cash, the tender by personal check did not comply
with the terms of the agreement.
In Cillessen v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297, 387 P.2d 867 (1964), the buyers
had an option to purchase an undivided one-half interest in certain land for a period
of 120 days for a sum certain. The option required that it be exercised in writing and
the court enforced that requirement.
Each of these cases involved a typical option, that is, one where there is a
definite purchase price and the object of the contract is to give the buyer the right to
buy the property at a certain price within a certain time frame. In the present case,

8-

there v-'.i:- ;.-

.- : ;:,'•. purchase price,

! lie object of the -"ontraet was n<<: to allow

Property Assistance tu buy the property fivn. the Roberts within a certain t i m e
period for a certain price. The object -•! ' .<-.•..!!:•• >• * *va- tn nr^vem .<•:* rlosure of the
secor

. - r t ^ j ^ c -n .a-, property and ah ;w the property Ito be sold to a third p a r t y so

t h a t both Property Assistance and the Roberts could benefit.
The trial court's finding t h a t this was not ;i I rue option agreement is clenrly
si. ( . •'•••:•

a i -

\ l -•

-'-ii

• in ai w iii L correctly applied the s t a n d a r d s

fta* d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r specific performance shou !(i be granted. The U t a h S u p r e m e
Court h a s said t h a t specific performance is an eo iutable remedy
525 P.2d 45

:,•••*"•<

Fisc'

.•-/-•

n,

, neiher to gnant specific performance, a

court should examine the a g r e e m e n t to be specifically enforced a n d d e t e r m i n e
w h e t h e r there exist equitable grounds to g r a n t specific performance

Otteson

v.

Malone, 584 P.2d 878 (Utah P>78). In lliis case, tin1 lioberts were three days a w a y
• * -• • in-iri^ ;;.< w home to foreclosure and had no fundi with which to pay Tracy
Collins. Property Assistance made it possible for the Roberts to reside in the home
from February of 1986 until J a n u a r v <»( l!*«s,S, w nhuiil a 'second mortgage p a y m e n t .
Clear

vva- equitable for the trial court to g r a n t specific performance of t h e

A g r e e m e n t and the Roberts have not argued to the contrary. T h u s , the trial court
dui not err in g r a n t i n g specific performance.
1

I ' T h A L -; 11" fl 1 I' i»l U L v M i ' ^ i I- * s ivmrvn

T.ne iriai o.mrt set the a m o u n t of the supersedeas bond to be filed in the event of
an appeal at $85,000. The Roberts failed to file such a tyond Instead, the\ filed a
b a n k r u p t c y nr ^-eduuc !-n-

• • - na

'

•

e effect of the trial court's decree.

The bankruptcy court granled Property Assistance's moti-m for relief from the
automatic stay.

T h e r e a f t e r , the R o b e r t s conveyed t h e pr<a . •

-9-

*

!

• jr" /

Assistance by quit claim deed and ultimately surrendered possession of the property
to Property Assistance. (Affidavits of Ellen Maycock and William J. Oelerich.)
In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1983), the court indicated that "An appeal is moot if during the pendency of
the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." 659 P.2d at 1043. In
this case, the Roberts have conveyed the property at issue to Property Assistance and
have surrendered possession of the property. Property Assistance, in accordance
with the decree of specific performance, is marketing the property for sale and
paying the financial obligations associated with the property. It is impossible to
return the parties to the positions they occupied before entry of the decree of specific
performance and this appeal is therefore moot.
III. IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT GRANTED SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, PROPERTY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM THE ROBERTS THE
AMOUNTS IT PAID TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE OF THE
SECOND MORTGAGE ON THE ROBERTS'RESIDENCE.
The trial court found that Property Assistance was entitled to specific
performance of the Agreement with the Roberts. Thus, the trial court did not reach
the question of whether Property Assistance was entitled to recover from the Roberts
the $40,000 Property Assistance paid to Tracy Collins to prevent the trustee sale of
the Roberts' property. For that reason, that issue is not properly before this court.
In the event that this court determines to consider that issue, however, it is
Property Assistance's position that it would be entitled to recover the amount it paid
to Tracy Collins from the Roberts on the theory of unjust enrichment.
The Roberts and Property Assistance entered into the A g r e e m e n t on
February 2, 1986. The trustee sale of the Roberts' home was scheduled for
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V *nr.. <>- r> " ^ -

, - " p i ! . a t e action was required to prevent

foreclosure,

Oelerich

contacted Tracy Collins and deposited funds necessary to induce Tracy Collins not to
proceed with the sale. If Oelerich had not done so, the sale w«
the Roberts •

/•

-f-*-r =

:

<; l

-

:'MO ode<: i-.f.

1 ne Agreement depended upon Property

Assistance's p r e v e n t i n g the trustee sale.
'!

For t h a t reason, it is absurd for the Roberts to argue, u> in* * :
t h a t Property A s s i s t a n t

'no-'- •* -

w i t h o u t r e q u e s t from m c i n .

•.». n> n

' - a c y 'Cohim- "'.u.unLa: . /

i'roperty A s s i s t a n c e w a s o b l i g a t e d u n d e r

i,
. * d
i^e

A g r e e m e n t to prevent foreclosure and it was the parties' itatent t h a t it du s<*
Section 1 II? t^f tho Rt^taLPHUMH nl' Restitution doe's not support the Roberts'
position, T h a t section <IL\I1.^ with a situation where a person confers a benefit upon
a n o t h e r "officiously". Property Assistance, acting in accoirdance with its A g r e e m e n t
with the Roberts, could har«; ; \ ''u- ()••• in.-r :, J :,\. ' M ^ / Tficiously.
Mua-i^iT

none ol* ,ne cases cited o\ * h» RohrrU involve p a y m e n t s m a d e

p u r s u a n t to an agreement. Kershaw

v. Tracy Collins Ba\nk & Trust Company,

P.2d 683 (Utah P)77 'involved a situation w ln-i

*'-

. .i : o : n \ . - ; -

561

\ * * t-*: services

\<-i'L*>j:.* * J - •- ationship with het deceased h u s b a n d . There was no
a g r e e m e n t t h a t the plaintiff would receive r e i m b u r s e m e n t for the services.
court said t h a t "Services rendered gratuitously and withoir -xp* ^ne
parties t h a t comptn'i-oi; n *•- • ••<: !*•..:.- i
Likewise, in McNulty

The
* I

unpen ,..!>.. . / d . at 685.

v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal.App. 1954) the court held t h a t ,

w h e n a party h a d been in possession of the property wrongfully nnd !;: ! n;-..d v-\*s
and the cost <S r* n\'v~ ;,5> ;,;i. : rltjM >-u -i >• v/-iagainst ar.^o

c • --n/o i-< .;fi >*,_.• i ::iobC expenses

- JI uorwise due to other parties, in Tabatfy v. Miirane,
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148 P.2d 605

(Cal. 1944), the issue was whether certain monies advanced by plaintiff to a decedent
were loans or voluntary payments.
In Shurnway v. Farley, 106 P.2d 194 (Ariz. 1940), the issue was whether the
defendants in a quiet title action could recover taxes they paid on lots in which the
court found they had no interest. No agreement was involved. In Brusco v. Brusco,
407 P.2d 645 (Ore. 1965), the issue was whether a property owner could recover a
cotenant's share of expenses. Again, no agreement was involved.
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings,

Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977)

arose from the efforts of the plaintiff to recover from a landlord the value of materials
furnished by the plaintiff to a tenant and incorporated into a building on the leased
premises. There was no agreement between the landlord and the plaintiff.
None of the cases cited by the Roberts in support of their argument that
Property Assistance would not be entitled to recover the amounts it paid to Tracy
Collins to prevent foreclosure of the Roberts' second mortgage has any factual
similarity to the present case. More importantly, in none of those cases was there
any agreement between the party conferring the benefit and the party benefiting.
In Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567 P.2d 1 (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that "The essence of the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment is that
the defendant has received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least
without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." 567 P.2d
at 2 (citations omitted).
In this case, the Roberts have had the benefit of Property Assistance's payment
of a $40,000 second mortgage. If Property Assistance had not paid the second
mortgage, the Roberts' house would have been sold at a trustee sale in 1986. Under
the Agreement, Property Assistance had the obligation to prevent foreclosure. Thus,
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it would be inequitable to allow the Roberts to retain the benefit of Property
Assistance's payment without recovery from the Roberts.
UUiNULUSlON

: - MV, • :ik d b\ the Roberts raises issues that weife not before the trial court.
Since the trial ct uirt f< uind that the Agreement was nd>t a win* ^ptiwn, it did not
consider whether an option mi isl be exercised

• •:•

• :*

-

its terms.

Likewise, because the trial court granted specific performance, it did not consider
whether Property Assistance was entitled to recover the amounts it spent to prevent
foreclosure of the Roberts' second mortgage.
! -

>r< :• n< p«"-Mrmance is an equitable remedy, It was entirely appropriate

for the trial court to grant specific performance of the contract between the parties.
The Roberts' entire course of conduct indicates that their -:,\i-\i\ A.
benefit in excess of *?•-;«) :!ii;

•

. ui.. a

performance of th^ir obligation^ under the

Agreement. Further, since the Roberts failed to file a supersedeas bond nnd the
provisions of the decree of specific performance have b^gun to go ••• •-•
appeal is n-v; >*.-..' .•-..! should he dismissed.
I • : i-

ii^

day of February, 1988.
KRUSE, LANIDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
620 Kearns Building
136 South Mainl Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

'ELLEN MA YCOCK
Attorneys fo|r Plaintiff

-13-

* h-s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following person, postage prepaid, this 5th day
ofFebruary, 1988:
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
Houpt & Eckersley
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Agreement of February 2s 1986

afjiS A g m t t t f t t t ,
MADE THIS
2nd day of Fet>ruar>
1986tBetu«** DPVglas C. and Betty J. Roberts, party
j the F** r*n, heritnaft* cried tk*-uiier9 and Property A s s i s t a n c e C o r p . ,
0/ the Second pari, hareina^at c&d

party

the "ityrr*

S f l t n e f i f t t l , Tfctf ta t^meideretiam * I 2 0 0 0 , - 0 0
fo the Seller
m hand paid by the Xyrr. receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Seller hereby grants to
the Buyer the right and option to purchase within 7
day* from the date hereof ALL

of Lot 71, Willow Stream Estates § 5, accordm to the
official plat thereof on file and of record In#the office
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
hereinafter called "8021 Erique Way".

// the Buyer dc*res to aerate the said option and shall, u.\thn the said penod so no*\fy the
Seller in writing, which nonce may be served personally upon the Seller ot hjt at the Sellers duelling
house or usual place of abode or be tent by mail addressed thereto, withm such period, thu option shall
' th*n h*mm* A M+d^^&z***^-*?^^
£w she ^sskr *zj frw*J«~« xn m T^U ^ «
and premises under the following conditions
J The pnee for the said property shall be the sum of I 2 0 0 0 . 0 0
of which the amount paid for thu option shall be applied on account

p i US S e e

tf2

2 Settlement u to take place at Kruse, Landa & Maycock 620 Kearns Bldg.
136 S . Mam S t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
on the 4 t h
day of February
19 &f) at 10:00
o'clock^ \t
which time u of the essence of thu agreement, when the Seller shall deliver a
warranty deed for the said premises, and the balance of the purchase price is to be paid or secured as

Buv'er agrees to market for sale 8021 Erique Way at a fair
market price. Bu>er agrees to pay to seller 25% of net
profits of any sale buyer accepts, payment made upon the
closing of any such sale.
Buyer agrees to assume responsibility for first and second
mortgage obligations. Seller is obligated to have first
mortgage payments current through January 31, 1986.

3 In the event of the Buyer not making settlement m accordance with the terms hereof, the
payment or payments made on account shall, at the Seller's option, be forfeited at liquidated damages
for the failure of the Buyer to settle, or be applied on account of the purchase price
4 The title to be delivered shall be a marketable title end thall be free and clear of all encum
brancei including municipal liens and assessments and liability for assessments for improvements now
constructed (eicept as herein stated) thit clause to be operative as of the date of thit agreement, and
the title is to be subject to all ecittmg rcstnct%ons of record, the Seller, however, guarantees that there
ate no restrictions in any conivyonce at plans of record arreting the said premises, which will pro

hibit the use and/or occupancy thereof as Property A s s i s t a n c e Corp.
and the premises shall be conveyed m the same condition as the tame now are, reasonable wear and
tear excepted
5 In the event that such title cannot be made hy the Seller as J>ove, and the Buyer u unwilling
to accept such title as the Seller can make, then ot Buyer's option, the above payment or payments
shall be returned to the Buijer, together with the reasonable expenses of esammtng the title and making
survey, or the Buyer may prosecute any legal or equitable action to whu:h the Buyer may be entitled
6 Actual possession is to be given to the Buyer on the day of settlement eicept as herein stated
If the Buyer accepts possession, with the Seller's consent, before the time of scrlement then the SelUr
shall be allowed by way of adjustment, interest at 0% on the oausnee due horn the date of possesion
to the date of settlement
7 Taxis, water rrmts, interest on encumbrancet, property rentals or*d other current charges shall
be adjusted as of the date of settlement, unless postassion be given prior thereto, in which case all such
adjustments thaU be made as of thu date of dehrery of poeaastion
8 The SeUar shsU pay for the irmpmg of the deed and all revenue stamps thereon, if any he
necessary, but aU searches, title tswmanca and other conveyancing expenses art to be paid for by the
Bttyer

. ^ ^ <W*^ ^ s X ^ SSS^to
;o upon
Upon closing, sellefc"
sellet- agrees to occupy 8021 Erique
/o
Way as Tenant for buy^r f >r a period of 90 da>s, or upon premises
being sold, whichever occurs first. Seller/tenant agrees to
monthly rental of $800.00 with a Minimum payment of $500.00 per
month to be paid on the J&
of eich month, commencing February,
1986. Balance due trom any shortage of monthly rental will be
deducted from seller/tenant's shate of proceeds from the sale of
8021 Erique Way.
^ y , This
r u s agreement contingent upon Ea
Eagar & Co., Realtor,
removal o£ exclusive listing and Commission for b
u /r.
. ,
btiw
17* words 'SELLEIC and 'BlTftlT
Plural and nngutar nutrhff
^
J ^
potations, m n f W
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In 3Hitam SBfcreo/.
dated thsdeyand^,

firm
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,„,

IUfuotrt

signatures

above u^ntten.
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For: PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP

